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MISDEMEANORS

Cecilia R. Byrne

*

I. INTRODUCTION
A police officer receives a citizen complaint that an individual has
been playing his car stereo at an excessive volume. The next day, the
officer sees a person matching the description from the complaint
driving down the freeway. Should the officer be allowed to pull this
individual over on suspicion of having committed a misdemeanor
noise violation? Should there be a bright-line rule against allowing
vehicle stops to investigate completed misdemeanors? Or, should the
validity of an investigatory stop be determined by a balancing of the
individual’s and the government’s interests on a case by case basis,
taking into account the threat to public safety posed by the completed misdemeanor?
“[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute[s] a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of” the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, even if “the purpose of the stop is limited and the re1
sulting detention quite brief.” However, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that some warrantless intrusions upon the consti2
The
tutionally protected interests of citizens are permissible.
*
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Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“[C]heckpoint stops are ‘seizures’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (“The
Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve
only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.”).
392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (“conclud[ing] that there must be a narrowly drawn authority to
permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he
has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”).
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standard of permissibility is whether the police officer is “able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru3
sion.” Thus, Terry established the “specific and articulable facts”
standard, premised upon the requirement of imminent or ongoing
criminal activity, as an exception to the warrant requirement.
In United States v. Hensley, the Court decided that the Fourth
Amendment allows police officers to conduct Terry stops if they “have
a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts,
that a person they encounter . . . is wanted in connection with a com4
pleted felony.” However, the Court in Hensley stopped short of deciding whether or not this ruling further extends to completed mis5
demeanors.
This Comment examines the court decisions that address whether
the Hensley holding also applies to completed misdemeanors. The
Comment argues that the Court’s holding in Hensley should extend to
these misdemeanors and that the validity of Terry stops should be determined on a case by case basis.
In Parts II and III, this Comment examines decisions by federal
and state courts that address this issue left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Hensley. In Part IV, this Comment argues that there
should not be a bright-line rule against allowing Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors. Instead, the Court’s holding in
Hensley should extend to past misdemeanors and the validity of Terry
stops should be determined by a balancing of the individual’s and the
government’s interests on a case by case basis. In applying the Fourth
Amendment balancing test, the Supreme Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature
6
of the reasonableness inquiry.” Rather than using the distinction between completed felonies and completed misdemeanors (both of
which can threaten public safety) as the basis for ruling on the legal-

3
4
5

6

Id. at 21.
469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985).
See id. (“We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past
crimes, however serious, are permitted.”); see also George E. Dix, Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 849, 873–74 (1985) (“In United States v.
Hensley, the Court carefully reserved the question whether ‘all past crimes, however serious’ permit nonarrest detentions on less than probable cause.” (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S.
at 229)).
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); see also Green v. State, 348 So. 2d 428, 429
(Miss. 1977) (“Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has ever
been able to articulate a concrete rule to determine what circumstances might justify an
investigatory stop.”).
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ity of investigatory stops, the use of a balancing test would allow
courts to determine whether a particular misdemeanor poses a seri7
ous risk to public safety. For example, it would be unnecessary to
differentiate between a case in which a citizen reports seeing an individual driving erratically and police officers believe the individual is
intoxicated from a case in which the police officers themselves see
the erratic driving, if the officers believe both situations pose an
equal threat to public safety.
Finally, Part V of this Comment argues that stops to investigate
completed misdemeanors should only be used as a means to protect
the public and not as a tool to solve crimes. Public safety is the only
government interest that would warrant the invasive intrusion into an
individual’s privacy rights resulting from stops to investigate past misdemeanors.
II. FEDERAL CASE LAW: THE SIXTH, EIGHTH, NINTH, AND TENTH
CIRCUITS CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE LEFT UNANSWERED IN
HENSLEY
To date, four circuits have addressed the issue left unanswered in
8
United States v. Hensley. In Hensley, police officers made an investigative stop of a person named in a “wanted flyer” they had received several days earlier. After opening the car door, the officer observed a
revolver protruding from underneath the passenger’s seat. The suspect was arrested and subsequently indicted by a federal grand jury
9
for being a convicted felon in possession of firearms. The Supreme
Court decided that the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to
conduct Terry stops if they “have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter [is] in10
volved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony.” The
Court held that the proper way to determine the validity of these investigatory stops is to apply the same Fourth Amendment balancing
test “already used to identify the proper bounds of intrusions that fur7

8
9
10

See generally Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 117 (Miss. 1999) (“The question is not whether a driver is suspected of a felony or misdemeanor, but whether a law
enforcement officer acts reasonably in stopping a vehicle to investigate a complaint short
of arrest.”); William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. REV. 771, 811 (1993) (“[I]n Tennessee v. Garner, the Court characterized
the felony/misdemeanor distinction as ‘highly technical,’ ‘minor,’ and ‘arbitrary.’ The
Court observed that many misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than that involved in many felonies.” (footnotes omitted)).
469 U.S. 221 (1985).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 229.
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ther investigations of imminent or ongoing crimes.”
This test
weighs “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus12
tify the intrusion.”
However, the Court in Hensley stopped short of deciding whether
or not their ruling—that the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to conduct Terry stops if they have a reasonable suspicion,
grounded in specific facts, that the person was involved or is wanted
in connection with a completed felony—extends to completed mis13
demeanors. The Court explicitly stated: “We need not and do not
decide today whether Terry stops to investigate all past crimes, how14
ever serious, are permitted.”
15
The Sixth Circuit was the first circuit to examine this issue. In
2004, in Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford, the Sixth Circuit created a
bright-line prohibition against stops based on the reasonable suspi16
cion of a “mere completed misdemeanor.” In this case, the arrestee
was alleged to have been driving erratically and to have been slumping in the car seat. The police officers stated they suspected he was
intoxicated, in violation of Michigan law. When they stopped him,
the officers testified that the arrestee jumped out of the car with a
17
knife, although the arrestee denied having any knife.
The court summarized the state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the Sixth Circuit and held:
Police may make an investigative stop of a vehicle when they have reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime, whether it be a felony or misdemeanor, including drunk driving in jurisdictions where that is a criminal
offense. Police may also make a stop when they have reasonable suspicion of a completed felony, though not of a mere completed misde18
meanor.

11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18

Id. at 228; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (“We must balance the
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.”);
Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698 n.7, 698–701 (1981) (reinforcing the idea of a
balancing test between intrusions on Fourth Amendment interests and governmental interests).
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228.
Id. at 229; see also Dix, supra note 5, at 873–74.
Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229; see also Dix, supra note 5, at 873–74 (“In United States v. Hensley,
the Court carefully reserved the question whether ‘all past crimes, however serious’ permit nonarrest detentions on less than probable cause.” (quoting Hensley, 469 U.S. at
229)).
Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford, 364 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 771 n.6.
Id. at 766–67.
Id. at 771 n.6 (citations omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit was the next circuit to consider this issue. In
2007, in United States v. Grigg, the Ninth Circuit refused the per se
20
standard adopted by the Sixth Circuit three years prior. In this case,
police officers discovered an unregistered firearm while conducting
an investigative stop of the defendant pursuant to a citizen’s complaint that the defendant had been playing his car stereo at excessive
21
volume earlier in the day. The court in Grigg instructed “that a reviewing court must consider the nature of the misdemeanor offense
in question, with particular attention to the potential for ongoing or
repeated danger (e.g., drunken or reckless driving), and any risk of
22
escalation (e.g., disorderly conduct, assault, domestic violence).” It
further held:
An assessment of the “public safety” factor should be considered within
the totality of the circumstances, when balancing the privacy interests at
stake against the efficacy of a Terry stop, along with the possibility that the
police may have alternative means to identify the suspect or achieve the
23
investigative purpose of the stop.

In the same year, the Tenth Circuit also refused a bright-line pro24
hibition against Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors.
In United States v. Moran, the Tenth Circuit followed the same reasoning applied by the Ninth Circuit in Grigg and held that, in order to
determine the constitutionality of an investigatory stop, courts must
balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus25
tify the intrusion.” In this case, the defendant’s car was stopped by

19
20
21
22
23

24

25

United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1072–73.
Id. at 1081.
Id.; see also Aaron Steinberg, Terry Stop of a Vehicle to Investigate a Completed Misdemeanor
Crime: U.S. v. Grigg, a Case of First Impression in the Ninth Circuit, 36 W. ST. U. L. REV. 207,
219 (2009) (explaining that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Grigg emphasized that an individual’s Fourth Amendment interest varies according to the circumstances of the stop”
and noting that, in this way, the court demonstrated “that there is some obligation on the
part of an officer to use less intrusive means of investigating a completed petty offense,
rather than merely stopping a suspect for questioning when other means of investigation
existed”).
United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Rachel S. Chase,
Case Comment, Criminal Procedure—Tenth Circuit Authorizes Investigatory Stops Based on Past
Misdemeanor Offenses—United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2007), 42 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 259, 266 (2008) (“In United States v. Moran, the Tenth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion of a past misdemeanor. The court’s decision to apply a fact-specific balancing test comports with the
constitutional limits of the Fourth Amendment and remains consistent with the majority
of circuit courts that have addressed the issue.”).
Moran, 503 F.3d at 1141 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985)).
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police officers, who found a loaded shotgun inside, after landowners
26
reported him trespassing in order to reach a public hunting area.
The Moran court noted that “the governmental interest in crime prevention and detection, necessarily implicated in a stop to investigate
ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, may not be present when officers are investigating past criminal conduct,” and determined that
the governmental interest in “solving crimes and bringing offenders
to justice” is particularly strong when the criminal activity involves a
27
threat to public safety.
Finally, in 2008, the Eighth Circuit weighed in on the issue left
28
unanswered in Hensley. In United States v. Hughes, the Eighth Circuit
followed the examples set by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits and refused a per se standard prohibiting police from conducting Terry
stops on the basis of a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and
articulable facts, that a person was involved or is wanted in connec29
tion with a completed misdemeanor. In this case, the defendant,
who was later charged with being a felon in possession of ammunition, was stopped and searched because he was standing near a bus
stop in a high crime area and he matched the description given by
the police dispatcher of someone who had recently committed crimi30
nal trespass.
In Hughes, the court followed the balancing test used in Hensley to
determine the validity of the investigatory stop at issue and noted that
“[u]nder this test, the nature of the misdemeanor and potential
31
threats to citizens’ safety are important factors.” When the Eighth
Circuit applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test to the facts at
issue in the case, it held that the governmental interest in investigating an earlier trespass did not outweigh the defendant’s individual
32
interest of being free from arbitrary interference by the police.
Thus, only one out of four circuits to address this issue has
adopted a bright-line prohibition against Terry stops to investigate

26
27
28

29
30
31
32

Id. at 1138–39.
Id. at 1142 (citing Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228–29).
See United States v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Terry
stop may be justified if a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a crime has been
committed, but the stop and frisk at issue was not a justified Terry stop).
See id. at 1017 (holding that specific and articulable facts can support and justify reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop).
Id. at 1015–16.
Id. at 1017; accord United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (2007); Moran, 503 F.3d at
1141.
See Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1018.
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33

completed misdemeanors. While the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all extended the Court’s holding in Hensley to reach to
34
prior misdemeanors, they have refused a per se rule. These circuits
determine the constitutionality of Terry stops to investigate completed
misdemeanors by balancing the individual’s and government’s inter35
ests on a case by case basis.
III. STATE CASE LAW: INCONSISTENCY IN STATE COURT DECISIONS
REGARDING WHETHER OR NOT TO ALLOW TERRY STOPS TO
INVESTIGATE COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS
In addition to federal court decisions, state court decisions are
important to consider in evaluating whether or not to allow Terry
stops to investigate completed misdemeanors. State court decisions
shed light on the importance of civil rights because states have the
option to protect individual liberties above and beyond what federal
law allows. In August of 1986, Justice William Brennan praised state
court actions in a speech to the ABA’s Section of Individual Rights
and Responsibilities and stressed the importance of considering state
court decisions in the evaluation of American law. Brennan stated:
[The] rediscovery by state supreme courts of the broader protections afforded their own citizens by their state constitutions—spawned in part
certainly by dissatisfaction with the decisional law being announced these
days by the United States Supreme Court—is probably the most important development in constitutional jurisprudence in our times. For state
constitutional law will assume an increasingly more visible role in Ameri36
can law in the years ahead.

Thus, it is important to consider all cases, both state and federal, in
order to make an informed evaluation of the reasonableness of Terry
stops to investigate completed misdemeanors.
Many state courts have addressed the issue left unanswered in
Hensley and, like the federal courts of appeals, have come to different
conclusions about whether or not to allow Terry stops to investigate
37
completed misdemeanors. Both the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
and the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, have adopted a
33
34
35
36
37

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
See Hughes, 517 F.3d at 1018; Moran, 503 F.3d at 1141; Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1081.
See supra note 34.
Paul Marcotte, Federalism and the Rise of State Courts, 73 A.B.A. J. 60, 64 (1987).
See, generally, State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Burgess,
776 A.2d 1223 (Me. 2001); Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110 (Miss. 1999); City of Devils
Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 2002); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash.
2002).
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bright-line prohibition against allowing police to stop vehicles in or38
der to investigate past misdemeanors.
In 1985, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota concluded in Blaisdell
v. Commissioner of Public Safety that “the limited benefits to the public
interest resulting from warrantless vehicle stops to investigate past
misdemeanors do not outweigh the intrusion on the ‘motorists’ right
39
to free passage without interruption.’” In this case, a clerk at a service station reported that a car, which was driven by a licensee, had
been involved in a “no-pay” theft two months earlier. An officer
stopped the licensee’s car and only then noticed that the licensee appeared to be intoxicated. After failing a preliminary breath test, the
40
licensee was arrested for DWI.
The Minnesota court in Blaisdell held that all vehicle stops to in41
vestigate past misdemeanors violate the Fourth Amendment and
emphasized that automobile stops to investigate completed misdemeanors do not advance the governmental interest in solving crimes,
since the owner of a car can be easily identified by looking up the li42
cense plate numbers of the vehicle. The court concluded by stating:
“While we can envision situations where an automobile stop could
advance the public interest to a greater degree than the present stop,
we do not believe this will arise in a misdemeanor context with sufficient frequency to appreciably advance the public interest in solving
43
past crimes.”
In 1988, the Court of Appeals of Florida, Fourth District, followed
the 1985 ruling of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Blaisdell and
crafted a per se rule prohibiting police from stopping vehicles to in44
vestigate past misdemeanors. Indeed, in State v. Bennett, the Florida
appellate court affirmed an order of the trial court holding that stops
to investigate suspects of completed misdemeanors are not permissi45
ble.

38

39
40
41

42
43
44
45

See Bennett, 520 So. 2d at 636 (accepting trial court’s findings in favor of a bright-line prohibition); Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883–84 (rejecting “warrantless vehicle stops to investigate past misdemeanors”).
Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883–84 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
557–58 (1976)).
Id. at 881.
Id. at 884; accord Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557–58 (stating that checkpoint stops do intrude to a limited extent on motorists’ rights to “free passage without interruption”
(quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)).
Blaisdell, 375 N.W.2d at 883.
Id.
See State v. Bennett, 520 So. 2d 635, 636 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that “stops to
investigate suspects of past misdemeanors are not permissible”).
Id.
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In contrast to the rulings of the appellate courts in Minnesota and
Florida, other states have rejected a per se rule prohibiting Terry stops
46
In 1986, in State v. Myers, the
to investigate past misdemeanors.
Court of Appeals of Louisiana, Second Circuit, applied the Fourth
Amendment balancing test to analyze the constitutionality of a vehi47
cle stop to investigate the suspect of a completed misdemeanor. In
this case, the defendant’s car was stopped by an officer who had received a teletype message to be on the lookout for a vehicle whose
description matched the defendant’s. The vehicle in question was
distinctive and had been seen running a stop sign earlier in the day.
After stopping the defendant, the officer discovered that the defen48
dant had been driving under the influence of alcohol. In Myers, the
court held that a teletype message notifying officers to be on the
lookout for a vehicle whose description matched the defendant’s
provided the police officer with reasonable cause to stop the defendant for the limited purpose of checking the driver’s identification—
a purpose which could not be accomplished simply by looking at the
49
license plate. The Louisiana court ruled that the police may stop
any person whom an officer reasonably suspects of committing an offense, be it a felony or a misdemeanor, and ask for the person’s
50
name, address, and an explanation of his actions.
In State v. Blankenship, a victim reported that the defendant’s car
was involved in an accident with hers, that it left the scene of the accident, and that the driver was intoxicated. Defendant contended
that the initial stop of his automobile was unlawful, and therefore the
51
evidence of intoxication should have been suppressed. The Court
of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee held that “some intrusions upon
the constitutionally protected interests of citizens [are] permissible.
The standard of permissibility is whether the police officer is ‘able to
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru52
sion.’” The court applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test to
the case at issue and concluded that the information provided to the
police officer met the “‘specific and articulable facts’” standard, and
46

47
48
49
50
51
52

See generally State v. Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223 (Me. 2001); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs,
749 So. 2d 110 (Miss. 1999); City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d. 466 (N.D.
2002); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash. 2002).
State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 701–02.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 703–04.
State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
Id. at 356 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
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thus the officer was justified, based on this information, in stopping
53
the defendant’s vehicle to investigate the completed crime.
Many other states have also adopted the Fourth Amendment balancing test to determine the validity of Terry stops to investigate com54
pleted misdemeanors. In 1999, in Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, a defendant was arrested after an individual reported to the police that
the defendant was driving at high speed and in a reckless manner.
The defendant argued that, because reckless driving is a misdemeanor and because the officer did not himself observe the defen55
dant driving in a reckless manner, the stop was unlawful. The Supreme Court of Mississippi applied the “specific and articulable facts”
standard from Terry as a test of reasonableness in holding that a vehi56
cle stop by a police officer was justified. In State v. Burgess in 2001, a
witness reported having seen the defendant driving while intoxicated.
Two days later, the officer returned to the area where the witness had
seen the defendant and stopped the defendant’s car, which matched
the description from the report. The officer observed no evidence of
57
The Suerratic driving, but the defendant failed a sobriety test.
preme Judicial Court of Maine held:
An investigatory stop is justified if at the time of the stop the officer has
an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct has taken place, is occurring, or imminently will occur, and the officer’s assessment of the existence of specific and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop is ob-

53
54

55

56
57

Id.
See State v. Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223, 1227 (Me. 2001) (“‘An investigatory stop is justified if
at the time of the stop the officer has an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct . . .
is . . . or imminently will occur, and the officer’s assessment of the existence of specific
and articulable facts sufficient to warrant the stop is objectively reasonable in the totality
of the circumstances.’” (quoting State v. Tarvers, 709 A.2d 726, 727 (Me. 1998)); Floyd v.
City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 114 (Miss. 1999) (“In determining whether there
exists the requisite ‘reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts,’ the
court must consider whether, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, the
detaining officers had a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.’” (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–
18 (1981)); City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d 466, 469–71 (N.D. 2002) (listing
factors to consider in determining the reasonableness of stopping a motor vehicle or possible offender); State v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513, 516–18 (Wash. 2002) (“‘[T]he nature and
quality of the intrusion on personal security [should be balanced] against the importance
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” (quoting United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985)).
See Floyd, 749 So. 2d at 114 (“Floyd contends that because reckless driving is a misdemeanor and because Officer Palmer did not personally observe Floyd driving in a reckless
manner, the stop . . . was unlawful as a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure.”).
See id. at 114 (elaborating on the “specific and articulable facts” standard set forth in Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
Burgess, 776 A.2d at 1226.
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jectively reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. Thus, an officer
has the authority to make an investigatory stop as a crime prevention or
58
detection function.

And, in 2002, the Supreme Courts of both North Dakota and
Washington used a totality of the circumstances approach in evaluat59
ing the validity of a Terry stop to investigate a past misdemeanor.
Finally, Texas, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania also all use the balancing test adopted in Hensley to determine the validity of Terry stops
to investigate completed misdemeanors, and have thus rejected a per
60
se standard against such stops.
IV. REJECTION OF A PER SE STANDARD AND ADOPTION OF THE
BALANCING TEST APPLIED IN HENSLEY TO DETERMINE THE VALIDITY OF
TERRY STOPS TO INVESTIGATE COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS
The Court in Hensley chose not to decide whether it is constitutional under the Fourth Amendment for police officers to conduct
investigatory stops if they have reasonable suspicion that the person
61
was involved in a completed misdemeanor. However, in light of the
Supreme Court’s prior application of the Fourth Amendment balancing test, policy considerations regarding public safety, and the lack of
a clear and meaningful distinction in the common law between felonies and misdemeanors, the holding in Hensley should apply not only
to completed felonies, but also to completed misdemeanors.

58
59

60

61

Id. at 1227 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting Tarvers, 709 A.2d at
727).
See City of Devils Lake, 639 N.W.2d. at 469 (“In determining whether an investigative stop is
valid, we use an objective standard and look to the totality of the circumstances.”); Duncan, 43 P.3d at 518 (describing a balancing test used to determine when law enforcement
may stop and detain an individual).
See State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 341 (N.H. 1995) (“We cannot say that, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the trial court erred in determining that the officer had a
reasonable suspicion that the driver was impaired.”); Commonwealth v. Janiak, 534 A.2d
833, 835 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (discussing the balancing test in which courts must engage
to determine individual rights when an automobile is subjected to search and seizure);
State v. Sailo, 910 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. App. 1995) (“The reasonableness of an investigative detention turns on the totality of the circumstances in each case.”).
See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985) (“[T]he police are not automatically shorn of authority to stop a suspect in the absence of probable cause merely because
the criminal has completed his crime and escaped from the scene.”).
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A. The Supreme Court Has Consistently Preferred a Fact-Specific Inquiry to
Bright-Line Rules in Applying the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court has consistently favored case by case inquiries
over bright-line rules in evaluating constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment. In Florida v. Jimeno, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. The Fourth
Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and sei62
zures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.”
“Reasonableness . . . is measured in objective terms by examining the to63
tality of the circumstances.” In applying the reasonableness test, the
Supreme Court has “consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead
64
emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.”
Accordingly, it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence for courts to reject a bright-line rule prohibiting police from conducting Terry stops to investigate completed
misdemeanors, and instead to adopt a balancing test to determine
the validity of such vehicle stops.
The constitutional requirements for an investigative stop and detention are less stringent than those for an arrest and are grounded
in the notion of reasonableness, which, in the context of the Fourth
Amendment, has never been articulated by the Supreme Court in
65
concrete terms. As noted by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in
Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, “the question [of reasonableness] is approached on a case-by-case basis. The United States Supreme Court

62
63
64

65

500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996).
Id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991) (reversing the Florida Supreme
Court’s adoption of a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus always constitutes a seizure and emphasizing that the proper inquiry necessitates consideration of “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter”); Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572–73
(1988) (“Rather than adopting either rule proposed by the parties . . . we adhere to our
traditional contextual approach, and determine only that, in this particular case, the police conduct in question did not amount to a seizure.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
506–07 (1983) (“Even in the discrete category of airport encounters, there will be endless
variations in the facts and circumstances, so much variation that it is unlikely that the
courts can reduce to a sentence or a paragraph a rule that will provide unarguable answers to the question whether there has been an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
See Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 115 (Miss. 1999) (“The test is thus one
of reasonableness, and neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has articulated a concrete rule to determine what circumstances justify an investigatory stop.”);
see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 817 (1996) (“[T]he decision to stop an
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. . . . [E]very Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors.”).
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has stated that, as a general rule, ‘the decision to stop an automobile
is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a
66
traffic violation has occurred.’”
In Adams v. Williams, the Court discussed the importance of police
discretion:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the
precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of
good police work to adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain
the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be
67
most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.

Thus, in order to make decisions about investigatory detentions that
are consistent with the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourth
Amendment, courts should apply a test balancing “the nature and
quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance
68
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion” in determining the constitutionality of Terry stops to investigate past misdemeanors.
B. Application of the Balancing Test Would Allow Courts to Uphold Terry
Stops to Investigate Completed Misdemeanors in Cases When There Is a
Threat to Public Safety
Extending the Court’s holding in Hensley to apply to completed
misdemeanors, as well as to completed felonies, would allow courts to
differentiate between cases based on whether or not there is a threat
to public safety, instead of forcing them to distinguish based on a legal characterization which may or may not have any relevance to
whether the safety of the public is at risk. A totality of the circumstances approach would allow courts to balance the government’s
and individual’s interests, and reach a conclusion in light of the par69
ticular facts and circumstances of each case. The standard of per66
67

68
69

Floyd, 749 So. 2d at 115 (quoting Whren, 517 U.S. at 810).
407 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1972) (internal citation omitted). See also David S. Rudstein, White
on White: Anonymous Tips, Reasonable Suspicion, and the Constitution, 79 KY. L.J. 661, 666
(1991) (discussing the Court’s holding in Adams that “reasonable suspicion can be based
upon information supplied by another person, provided that the information carries sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Adams, 407 U.S. at 147)).
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985).
Cf. Sameer Bajaj, Note, Policing the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of Warrantless
Investigatory Stops for Past Misdemeanors, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310–11 (2009) (arguing
that “warrantless police stops to investigate completed misdemeanors are constitutional
only when employed to defuse an ongoing danger”); Rachel S. Weiss, Note, Defining the
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missibility, as articulated in Terry, should be whether the police officer
is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] in70
trusion.”
In a contrary line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota
held that all vehicle stops to investigate past misdemeanors violate the
71
Fourth Amendment. In Blaisdell v. Commissioner of Public Safety, the
court stated, “[w]hile we can envision situations where an automobile
stop could advance the public interest to a greater degree than the
present stop, we do not believe this will arise in a misdemeanor context with sufficient frequency to appreciably advance the public in72
terest in solving past crimes.”
However, there have been many
cases, including State v. Myers, in which exactly such a situation oc73
curred. In Myers, the court wrote:
We have a scenario apparently involving a driver who left the scene of an
accident. Damage was caused, perhaps intentionally, to government
property. At the very least, we are dealing with an impaired or nonattentive driver who might have been dangerous to other traffic. The
safety of the motoring public and the potential capacity of the automobile to inflict serious damage provides a fairly strong government inter74
est.

State v. Blankenship is another case involving a misdemeanor in
which the governmental interest in protecting the public significantly
outweighed the individual’s interest in personal security.
In
Blankenship, the defendant had left the scene of the accident before
the police could arrive. However, the victim provided information
which led the police to stop the defendant, at which time the officer
75
The Tennessee
determined that the defendant was intoxicated.
Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the officer was justified,
based on the information provided, in stopping the defendant’s vehicle to investigate a completed misdemeanor, because the intoxicated

70
71

72
73

74
75

Contours of United States v. Hensley: Limiting the Use of Terry Stops for Completed Misdemeanors, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1321, 1348–49 (2009) (arguing for a dangerous-driving exception
to a per se approach against all Terry stops for completed misdemeanors).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
See Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(“[V]ehicle stops to investigate completed misdemeanors violate the fourth amendment
of the United States Constitution.”).
Id. at 883.
See State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 704 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing a case involving a
traffic stop of a vehicle following a completed misdemeanor and the ways in which the
driver could have harmed the public).
Id. at 704.
State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988).
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driver posed a threat to other drivers and pedestrians. Due to the
significant threat that a reckless or intoxicated driver can pose to the
safety of the public, it is important for officers to be allowed to investigate cases, including completed misdemeanors, in which the safety
of the public is at risk as a result of such criminal activity.
It is true that some completed misdemeanors pose no resulting
risk to the safety of the public, and it is for just this reason that courts
should use a balancing test, instead of a bright-line rule, to evaluate
the constitutionality of a Terry stop to investigate completed misdemeanors. For example, in United States v. Hughes, the Eighth Circuit
balanced the “nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to jus77
tify the intrusion,” including the resulting threat to public safety,
and determined that “the governmental interest in investigating a
78
previous trespass [did] not outweigh Hughes’s personal interest.”
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland aptly
noted in United States v. Jegede in 2003:
It is one thing to uphold a stop on suspicion of a misdemeanor, not
committed in an officer’s presence, when there is potential for repeated
danger, such as weaving or other dangerous driving. It is quite another
to uphold a stop for a completed misdemeanor when there is no indication that it will be repeated, or cause danger to others, and particularly
79
when the police have the means to identify the driver.

Thus, instead of distinguishing between completed felonies and
completed misdemeanors, courts should distinguish between cases
which involve a threat to public safety and those that pose no such
threat in determining the validity of Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors.
C. There Is an Arbitrary Distinction between Felonies and Misdemeanors in
the Context of Terry Stops
As noted in Part IV.B of this Comment, it is arbitrary to distinguish between completed felonies and completed misdemeanors in
the context of Terry stops, when both involve a risk to public safety
and when the officer acts reasonably in detaining the vehicle. This
76

77
78
79

See id. (noting that the information provided to Officer Cook met the “specific and articulable facts” standard and “Officer Cook was justified, based on this information, in stopping the defendant’s vehicle to investigate a crime,” especially given that it was “in the
context of . . . [a] crime[] involving a threat to public safety”).
517 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229
(1985)).
Id. at 1018.
294 F. Supp. 2d 704, 708 (D. Md. 2003).
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issue has been discussed by both state and federal courts. In Floyd,
the Supreme Court of Mississippi rejected a bright-line rule against
Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, in part because
“applying the felony/misdemeanor distinction in traffic violation
cases would require law enforcement officials to ignore communications of other officials warning of drivers who may be impaired, ill,
reckless, or dangerous to the public unless the officer has probable
80
cause to arrest.” The court further noted:
The felony/misdemeanor distinction . . . is not the correct test by which
to evaluate whether an investigative stop is reasonable. The question is
not whether a driver is suspected of a felony or misdemeanor, but
whether a law enforcement officer acts reasonably in stopping a vehicle
81
to investigate a complaint short of arrest.

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has also recognized the
drawbacks of distinguishing between felonies and misdemeanors in
the context of investigatory stops. In State v. Blankenship, the court
held that the “difference between felonies and misdemeanors is a legislative, not a constitutional, distinction. Any fourth amendment or
82
Terry analysis should apply to all crimes.” Thus, when a police officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken to83
gether with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant”
the detention of a vehicle, and when the governmental interests, including the threat to public safety, outweigh the nature and quality of
the intrusion on personal security, it is arbitrary to prohibit a Terry
stop to investigate the past criminal activity simply because that activity was a completed misdemeanor.
Several federal courts have also questioned the felony/misdemeanor distinction in the application of the Fourth
Amendment. In Street v. Surdyka,
the Fourth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment should not “be interpreted to prohibit warrantless arrests for misdemeanors committed
outside an officer’s presence.” The court reached this result in significant part because it believed that the felony/misdemeanor distinction “is
84
no longer as significant as it was at common law.”

80
81
82

83
84

Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 117 (Miss. 1999).
Id. at 117.
757 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); see also State v. Bryant, 678 S.W.2d 480, 483
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1984) (noting that the State of Tennessee’s “limitation on warrantless
arrests for misdemeanors is not constitutionally required”).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
Schroeder, supra note 7, at 811 (footnote call numbers omitted) (quoting Street v.
Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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The Supreme Court has also recognized the difficulty of determining
how the difference between felonies and misdemeanors relates to the
application of the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Hensley, the
Court utilized the felony/misdemeanor distinction in holding that
police may only conduct Terry stops to investigate completed felo85
nies; however, only months later, in Tennessee v. Garner,
the Court characterized the felony/misdemeanor distinction as
“highly technical,” “minor,” and “arbitrary.” The Court observed that
many misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than that involved
in many felonies, and rejected the argument that deadly force should be
permitted to effect the seizure of any felon because such seizures were
86
permitted at common law.

Additionally, in Justice White’s dissent in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Justice noted that “the category of misdemeanors today includes enough
serious offenses to call into question” the legal distinction between
87
felonies and misdemeanors. Thus, it is arbitrary and impractical to
limit Terry stops by police officers to the investigation of only completed felonies.
V. STOPS TO INVESTIGATE COMPLETED MISDEMEANORS SHOULD ONLY
BE USED AS A MEANS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC AND NOT AS A TOOL TO
SOLVE CRIMES
This Part examines the importance of considering public safety in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in both federal and state court
decisions. Then, this Part argues that because public safety is such an
important aspect of the government interest element of the Fourth
Amendment balancing test, and because no other government interest would sufficiently justify the invasive intrusion into personal security that results from Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, protecting the public from harm resulting from a past
misdemeanor is the only government interest that would warrant
such investigatory stops.

85

86
87

469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops to
investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permitted. . . . [I]f police have a reasonable suspicion . . . that a person they encounter was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that suspicion.”).
Schroeder, supra note 7, at 811 (internal footnotes omitted) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (1985)).
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 761 (1984) (White, J., dissenting); see also Schroeder,
supra note 7, at 811 n.144.
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A. The Importance of Public Safety in Examining the Strength of the
Government’s Interest in the Fourth Amendment Balancing Test
In applying the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test to Terry
stops, courts must balance the nature and quality of a detention’s impact on “personal security against the importance of the governmen88
When there is a
tal interests alleged to justify the [detention].”
threat to public safety, the government has a strong interest in pro89
tecting the public from harm. In Grigg, the Ninth Circuit laid out
the rule derived from Hensley regarding the constitutionality of Terry
stops. The court stated:
[A] court reviewing the reasonableness of an investigative stop must consider the nature of the offense, with particular attention to any inherent
threat to public safety associated with the suspected past violation. A
practical concern that increases the law enforcement interest under Hensley is that an investigating officer might eliminate any ongoing risk that
an offending party might repeat the completed misdemeanor or that an
officer might stem the potential for escalating violence arising from such
conduct, both of which enhance public safety. Conversely, the absence
of a public safety risk reasonably inferred from an innocuous past misdemeanor suggests the primacy of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment inter90
est in personal security.

Furthermore, in Welsh, the Court observed that the nature and seriousness of an offense is “an important factor to be considered when
determining whether any exigency exists” that would justify a war91
rantless home arrest. The reasoning in Welsh was not applied spe92
cifically to a vehicle stop, but the Court’s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in this case could be extended to apply to all
Terry stops. Therefore, it is important to consider the nature of the
88
89

90

91
92

See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 228 (describing the reasonableness test).
See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th Cir. 2007) (requiring courts to consider the nature of the offense and the threat to public safety from the past violation
when determining reasonableness); see also State v. Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223, 1227–28 (Me.
2001) (upholding the constitutionality of a vehicle stop to investigate complaint of previous threat by drunken man to shoot a vehicle); Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d
110, 117–19 (Miss. 1999) (holding that stop of vehicle reported to have driven recklessly
was constitutional); State v. Blankenship, 757 S.W.2d 354, 356–57 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1988) (holding stop constitutional on report that suspect was involved in hit-and-run accident).
Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1080; see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229 (“Particularly in the context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety . . . law enforcement interests . . . in
these circumstances outweigh the individual’s interest to be free of a stop and detention
that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or ongoing
crimes.”).
Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753; see also Schroeder, supra note 7, at 818.
See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753 (noting the extenuating circumstances that qualified it as more
than a vehicle stop).
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criminal activity at hand in determining the governmental interest
and the threat to public safety.
The importance of public safety in examining the strength of the
government’s interest in a Fourth Amendment balancing test is also
evident in state court cases addressing the issue of Terry stops in the
93
misdemeanor context. For example, in City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that an investigatory
stop, based on a call from a police dispatch that a fight was going to
begin at a bar and a description by a witness that the defendant was
the one involved in the verbal altercation, was constitutional:
A law enforcement officer could reasonably infer and deduce from this
dispatch, at the very least, the possibility that someone at the bar had engaged in, or was engaging in, “violent, tumultuous, or threatening behavior” with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person within the
94
meaning of [the state statute], to necessitate a call for police assistance.

The North Dakota court did not specifically mention Hensley;
however, the “court was alert to the potential threat arising from a
suspected past misdemeanor of disorderly conduct, which favored
permitting the investigatory stop to quell the possibility of escalating
95
violence.”
Additionally, the Louisiana appellate decision in Myers, that a vehicle stop to investigate the suspected perpetrator of a completed
misdemeanor was constitutional, was based in part on the fact that in
this case the government’s interest in protecting the public from
96
harm outweighed the defendant’s interest in personal security. The
court stated that “[t]he safety of the motoring public and the potential capacity of the automobile to inflict serious damage provides a
97
fairly strong government interest.”

93

94
95
96
97

See generally State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Burgess, 776 A.2d 1223;
Floyd, 749 So. 2d 110; City of Devils Lake v. Lawrence, 639 N.W.2d. 466 (N.D. 2002); State
v. Duncan, 43 P.3d 513 (Wash. 2002) (discussing different examples of Terry stops in state
misdemeanor cases).
City of Devils Lake, 639 N.W.2d at 473.
Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1079.
See Myers, 490 So. 2d at 704 (noting how a strong governmental interest exists when the
safety of the public is at issue).
Id.
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B. Protecting the Public from Harm: The Only Government Interest That
Warrants an Investigatory Detention in the Context of a Completed
Misdemeanor
Because public safety is such an important aspect of the govern98
ment interest element of the Fourth Amendment balancing test,
99
and because no other government interest would sufficiently justify
the intrusion into personal security that results from Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, protecting the public from harm
resulting from a past misdemeanor is the only government interest
100
that would warrant an investigatory stop.
In such a case, the government’s interest in solving the misdemeanor crime is great enough
to outweigh the resulting invasion into personal security and to warrant a stop to investigate the completed crime.
Even though the Supreme Court did not extend its holding in
Hensley to apply to completed misdemeanors, the Court did note the
differences between the government’s interest in ongoing crimes and
101
With Terry stops to investigate
its interest in completed crimes.
completed crimes, the government has no interest in crime prevention or detection because the criminal activity is not ongoing or imminent, “the exigencies requiring a police officer to step in to prevent [the] crime are not present,” and “because the crime has been
committed, the police have greater latitude to choose the time and
102
Furthermore, with less serious ofplace to talk to the suspect.”

98
99

100

101

102

See Grigg, 498 F.3d at 1079–80 (stating that any particular threat to public safety is a key
part of the analysis).
Cf. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment:
“Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 616 (2005) (“On the ‘government
interest’ side of the balance, the Court examines a wide range of factors, including the seriousness and immediacy of the harm sought to be prevented, the degree of individualized or target-group suspicion, the presence of a warrant, warrant-substitute, or other limits on police discretion, the feasibility of applying individualized suspicion and warrant
requirements in this context, the importance of the evidence or other expected fruits of
the intrusion, the availability of other means to achieve the government’s interest, and
the effectiveness of the means chosen.”).
Cf. Bajaj, supra note 69, at 310–311 (arguing that “warrantless police stops to investigate
completed misdemeanors are constitutional only when employed to defuse an ongoing
danger”); Weiss, supra note 69, at 1348–49 (arguing for a dangerous-driving exception to
a per se approach against all Terry stops for completed misdemeanors).
See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 228 (1985) (noting that, despite the limits, a
police officer is not prohibited from stopping a suspect of a past crime); Major Wayne E.
Anderson, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Terry Stops—But Thought It Was a
Violation of the Fourth Amendment to Stop Someone and Ask, 1988 ARMY LAW. 25, 28 (noting
that the government may have a more compelling interest in a completed crime when it
was a threat to public safety).
Anderson, supra note 101, at 28.
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fenses, the government’s interest in quickly solving the crime is also
weaker. “[T]he less serious the offense under investigation, the
greater the limits the Constitution imposes on the kind of actions the
government can take to investigate the offense and to seize the of103
fender.”
In fact, in many cases involving stops of automobiles, officers do
not need to utilize the Terry stop to advance the governmental interest of solving crimes. As noted in Blaisdell, “[t]he name of the owner
of the car can be obtained by recording the license plate numbers of
104
the vehicle,” and does not need to be learned through stopping the
105
vehicle. Thus, utilizing the Terry stop to investigate completed misdemeanors in cases in which there is no threat to public safety resulting from the illegal conduct can result in an unnecessary invasion of
the driver’s personal security.
Even though the government’s interest in solving crimes does not
outweigh the intrusion into personal security resulting from Terry
stops, there are cases in which the government has a strong interest
in investigating completed misdemeanors. As discussed above, when
a completed misdemeanor causes a threat to public safety, the government’s interest in investigating the past crime can outweigh the
106
For example, in Floyd, the
resultant invasion of personal security.
Supreme Court of Mississippi held that an investigatory stop, based
on a description of a car made by a witness who had seen the car driving at a high rate of speed and in a reckless manner, was constitutional even though the officer had not personally observed the crimi107
nal behavior.
The court based its holding on the fact that the officer had a reasonable suspicion, grounded on specific and articulable facts, that the
108
defendant had been driving recklessly. In addition, they noted the
strong governmental interest in protecting the public from potential
103

104
105
106
107
108

Schroeder, supra note 7, at 820 & n.193; see also Hensley, 469 U.S. at 229; Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 756 (1984); cf. Note,
Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV.
664, 677 (1961) (“[T]he detection of minor crimes might legitimize only minor invasions
of privacy.”).
Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
See id. (noting that the governmental interest is not as great when making a stop that is
connected to a past, completed crime).
See United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1079–80 (noting that a continued threat to public safety strengthens the governmental interest).
See Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So. 2d 110, 116 (Miss. 1999) (stating that an officer can make a stop so long as he has a reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity).
See id. at 118 (noting that the officer had a specific description of Floyd’s car and there
was a complaint of reckless driving).
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harm caused by the suspect of the past misdemeanor.
stated:

109

The court

The public concern served by the seizure is evident—a reckless driver
poses a mortal danger to others. There exists in such a situation an absolute necessity for immediate investigatory activity. . . . To cling to a rule
which would prevent a police officer from investigating a reported complaint of reckless driving would thwart a significant public interest in pre110
venting the mortal danger presented by such driving.

Thus, in Floyd, the government had a strong interest in investigating
the past misdemeanor because of the potential for a resulting threat
to public safety.
In State v. Duncan, the Washington State Supreme Court held that
a Terry stop to investigate a person who may have been observed
drinking alcohol in public was unconstitutional under the Fourth
111
In coming to this conclusion, the court “acknowlAmendment.
edged the principle in Hensley that the traditional interest in officer
safety and crime prevention ‘may not be present when dealing with
112
In this case, unlike some of the above cases involving
past crime.’”
reckless driving which could result in harm to others even after the
witnesses were no longer in sight of the criminal action, there was arguably no threat to the public caused as a result of the public consumption of alcohol; the court therefore ruled the police investiga113
Furthermore, because of the lack of severity
tion unconstitutional.
of the crime, the governmental interest in solving the crime did not
114
outweigh the personal intrusion resulting from the investigation.
Thus, adopting a balancing test, instead of a per se standard, in
which courts can take into account the threat to public safety caused
115
by the completed misdemeanor, renders the holding in Blaisdell irrelevant because the governmental interest in solving crimes is not

109
110
111
112

113
114
115

See id. at 117 (stating that the intrusion to Floyd was minimal and the interest served was
great).
Id.
43 P.3d 513, 521 (Wash. 2002) (refusing to extend Terry stops to past crimes that officers
did not witness and that did not involve a traffic infraction).
United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The . . . focus on preventing
crimes, and promoting the interests of justice in arresting felons in Hensley, suggests that the
interest in preventing civil infractions may not be accorded the same weight.” (quoting
Duncan, 43 P.3d at 518)).
See Duncan, 43 P.3d at 521 (“Possessing or consuming alcohol in public is not a
crime . . . .”).
See id. at 518–19 (noting that, with a lesser crime, a lower level of intrusion will be tolerated).
See Blaisdell v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 880, 883–84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that the balancing test weighs the benefit to the public against the intrusion upon
the motorist’s rights).
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considered when weighing the interests. Instead, the only interest
that outweighs an individual’s privacy rights is the government’s interest in protecting the public from harm.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment addresses the issue of whether or not the holding
in Hensley—that police officers are allowed to conduct Terry stops if
they have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person is wanted in connection with a completed
felony—should extend to completed misdemeanors. The Comment
examines the federal and state court decisions that adopt a brightline prohibition against such stops and the decisions that balance the
interests on a case by case basis, and argues that the holdings adopting a balancing test are more persuasive and consistent with the Su116
The constitupreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
tionality of Terry stops should be determined by a balancing of the
individual’s and the government’s interests on a case by case basis,
because the Supreme Court has consistently favored fact-specific reasonableness inquiries over bright-line rules in applying the Fourth
Amendment and because a balancing test would allow courts to validate Terry stops in cases where there is a threat to public safety associated with the crime.
Finally, this Comment examines the importance of public safety in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by looking at federal and state
court decisions addressing this issue, and argues that public safety is
the only government interest that would warrant the invasive intrusion into individual privacy rights associated with stops to investigate
117
past misdemeanors.
Because public safety is such an important aspect of the government interest element of the Fourth Amendment
balancing test, and because no other government interest would sufficiently justify the invasive intrusion into personal security that results from Terry stops to investigate completed misdemeanors, protecting the public from harm posed by certain misdemeanors is the
only government interest that would warrant such investigatory stops.

116
117

See supra Parts II, III, and IV.
See supra Part V.

